Study Reveals UAE’s Use of Proxy Wars in Regional Conflicts

A recent study by the research centre Stratfor has shed light on how the United Arab Emirates (UAE) employs proxy wars as a tool in its regional conflicts, with Yemen and Sudan emerging as notable victims of this approach.

The study delves into the escalating regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, highlighting the increasing tensions between the two Gulf nations. It warns that these tensions will likely lead to heightened economic, diplomatic, and defence competition between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, making it challenging for some companies to operate in both countries simultaneously and exacerbating security risks in nations like Sudan and Yemen.

The study points to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s statements concerning strained relations with the UAE, accusing Abu Dhabi of backstabbing Riyadh.

The research underscores that Mohammed bin Salman’s statements reflect the competition between the different development models and foreign policies of both the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

The competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi increasingly focuses on attracting investments, tourism, and skilled labour, and establishing their reputations as regional business hubs. Their economic diversification models intersect in various areas.

However, the study notes that the two countries also pursue conflicting foreign policies, including long-standing disagreements over handling the war in Yemen and recent divisions over the side receiving support in Sudan’s ongoing civil conflict.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have enjoyed close relations since Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ascended to power in 2016. Still, their post-oil development programs have increasingly started to overlap in recent years, with wide similarities between Saudi Vision 2030 and the UAE’s various economic diversification plans.

This includes goals such as boosting tourism, attracting foreign direct investment, transforming cities into technological and financial centres, and initiating massive projects to drive development.

In 2021, Saudi Arabia announced that international companies would be required to move their main regional headquarters to the Kingdom by 2024 or risk losing government contracts. Observers viewed this move as a solid attempt to compel companies to relocate from the UAE.

The study suggests that the growing competition between the UAE and Saudi Arabia will mainly be centred on the economic front, with the UAE being the smaller country and thus bearing more risks in its economic competition with Saudi Arabia.

On the foreign policy level, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have long-term and diverging strategies to secure influence along the Red Sea, involving them in favouring different sides in the ongoing civil conflict in Sudan.

Both nations have significant investments in Sudan, including ports and agricultural projects, to ensure their food security and gain influence over international trade from the Red Sea to the Suez Canal.

This economic rivalry affects how the Gulf competitors view the warring factions in Sudan’s conflict. Saudi Arabia seeks to resolve the escalation by influencing the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The Saudis are closer to the army’s leader, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Meanwhile, the Emiratis are closer to RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemiti.”

In Yemen, Saudi Arabia leans towards supporting the internationally recognized government. At the same time, the UAE backs the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which advocates for the secession of Southern Yemen from the north.

In both cases, the Saudis feel more comfortable working with internationally recognized governments and leaders, even if these countries are ineffective or corrupt. In contrast, the Emiratis appear more willing to use “proxies” that may threaten the unity of the countries in which they operate to achieve their objectives.

While Saudi Arabia aims to secure its territory from Iran-backed Houthi attacks and reduce their role in Yemen, the UAE is more focused on developing and gaining control of Yemeni ports. The UAE also targets political Islamic movements, such as the Yemeni Islah Party, and envisions Southern Yemen as a potential economic partner in case of secession.

Reports in 2019 indicated that the UAE angered Saudi Arabia when it withdrew its forces from fighting the Houthis to focus on its interests in the south.

Without a unified approach towards Yemen, the Southern Transitional Council, backed by Abu Dhabi, might challenge the weak Yemeni government supported by Saudi Arabia, seeking to increase its autonomy or even declare secession.

Such a secession scenario might become more likely if Saudi Arabia becomes aggressive towards the UAE, as the Emiratis have worked to convey the risks of such an approach to the Kingdom, threatening the unity of the southern neighbour.

In Sudan, Saudi Arabia has attempted to mediate an end to the fighting to preserve its unity, but it conflicts with entrenched positions on both sides. Meanwhile, the Emiratis have made fewer attempts to use their influence over the Rapid Support Forces to stop the fighting, believing that such attempts may lead to setbacks in their gains in the country or that the ongoing conflict may expand the RSF’s influence in Sudan.

The UAE’s continued financial and military support will likely encourage the RSF to keep fighting, potentially prolonging the conflict and turning it into a protracted civil war.