UAE’s Full Commitment Strategy to Normalization and Relations with Israel
An Analytical Article Focusing on the UAE’s Strategy of Total Commitment to Normalization and Strengthening Relations with Israel in the Context of the Ongoing Israeli Conflict in Gaza and Lebanon for Over a Year.
The article published by the Gulf House for Studies and Publishing noted that Gulf diplomacy is not applying any significant pressure on Washington to bring an end to the Israeli war.
The article noted that although this claim remains a hypothesis requiring validation, the media narratives from some Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, indicate that these countries see this war as a unique opportunity to weaken—and perhaps even eliminate—what they perceive as Iran’s influential proxies in the region, particularly Hezbollah.
The contradiction between the political positions expressed by foreign ministries and government statements, and the content of both state and private media in these countries—led by Al Arabiya and Sky News Arabia—indicates that there is a narrative being emphasized, which attributes the responsibility for the ongoing events to the resistance axis led by Iran.
This narrative suggests that ‘these rogue organizations and their resort to military action have been, and continue to be, the reason for complicating the situation and exposing thousands of Palestinians to death and displacement. Additionally, these militias are the ones obstructing, in practical terms, the two-state solution that Gulf countries see as feasible through the lens of normalizing relations with Israel.’
Although Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain share several commonalities, it is important to note their differences. Riyadh seems more cautious about normalization with Israel and prefers to obtain the benefits of any political agreement in advance. This stands in contrast to Abu Dhabi, which is focused on an early advancement in normalization and building relationships with Tel Aviv.
The normalization of relations between Gulf countries and Israel has gained prominence, with Israel seen as a viable alternative to offset the United States’ withdrawal from the region and its pivot toward the East, particularly toward Russia and China.
On the ground, the United States continues to maintain its military bases across all Gulf countries, which undermines the credibility of this claim, particularly in light of the Gulf states’ persistent efforts to secure additional defense agreements with Washington and to realign their relations with Iran.
This is particularly highlighted by the recent clear statements from Gulf states indicating that they will not permit the use of any of their military bases or airspace for launching any military strikes by Israel or the United States against Iran.
Historically, prior to Britain’s arrival in the Gulf in 1820, the Gulf states—then fragile sheikhdoms—successfully managed their relations with Iran for almost two centuries.
What is clear today, more than ever, is that Israel’s presence in the Gulf does not assure the security of its states against Iran; instead, it adds to the complexity of the situation. Turning the cities and ports of the Gulf Arab states into platforms for Israeli operations or a battleground for Mossad activities amidst the conflicts between Tehran and Tel Aviv puts the security of these countries at even greater risk.
Referring to the situation of the war in Gaza and Lebanon, and assuming that the trio—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain—shapes its positions pragmatically based on the benefits of Israel’s elimination of Iran’s proxies, namely Hamas and Hezbollah, we find that a decisive victory for Israel does not align with the interests of the Gulf states.
Looking at the war in Gaza and Lebanon, and assuming that the trio—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain—takes a pragmatic approach to benefit from Israel’s removal of Iran’s proxies, namely Hamas and Hezbollah, it becomes clear that a sweeping victory for Israel does not serve the interests of the Gulf states.
If Israel comes out of this war secure, both internally and along its borders, it would entirely exempt itself from discussions regarding the two-state solution, let alone accepting it. Moreover, this would relieve Washington of its obligation to pressure Tel Aviv into making any concessions for normalizing relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv. As a result, the set of incentives that Riyadh has attached to normalizing its relationship with Tel Aviv would effectively be rendered obsolete.
The article states that Gulf states lack a clear strategy or vision to coordinate their political positions, diplomatic efforts, and media narratives concerning the Israeli war in Gaza and Lebanon. This suggests that the differences in perspectives and political divergences among the council members are still pronounced.
The article highlights that Gulf states lack a coherent strategy or vision to align their political positions, diplomatic efforts, and media narratives regarding the Israeli war on Gaza and Lebanon. This suggests that the differences in outlooks and political disparities among the council members remain pronounced.
Gulf states continue to navigate their relationships with both Israel and Iran by relying on the daily developments of the conflict between Tehran and Tel Aviv, rather than employing robust, unified strategies and tactics that protect the interests of the Arab Gulf states and ensure regional stability. This creates a striking contradiction in the policies and media narratives of the council members.
The withdrawal of Gulf states from taking a meaningful political and diplomatic role in the crisis may constrain their future influence, leaving them vulnerable to the gaps created by both Israel and Iran, which could ultimately lead to a decline in their power.
The article concluded that the normalization of relations with Israel has not provided Gulf states with any advantage in influencing Israeli policies during the war, nor has it enabled Israel to leverage the Gulf states in its conflict with Iran.
