موقع إخباري يهتم بفضائح و انتهاكات دولة الامارات

UAE’s Cyber Campaign: Vilifying Resistance, Backing Israel, and Boosting Abu Dhabi”

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Over recent weeks, a heightened level of activity among electronic flies has been observed, marked by the creation of numerous fake accounts on social media platforms. These accounts are actively commenting on developments in the ongoing Israeli conflict in Gaza.

Monitoring the activities of these Emirati digital operatives reveals their focus on three primary objectives: disparaging the Palestinian resistance, supporting Israel, and promoting Abu Dhabi’s purported humanitarian efforts in Gaza.

These electronic flies from the UAE have intensified their campaigns by impersonating Palestinians using fake names, aiming to sow discord and manipulate local public opinion in Gaza against the resistance factions.

The suspicious Emirati activity stems from incitement to the resistance by holding it responsible for the destruction of Gaza and that it is only in the service of senior officials, in addition to accusing it of stealing humanitarian aid.

On the other hand, the tweets of the Emirati electronic flies belittle the operations of the Palestinian resistance and its steadfastness in the face of massacres and the Israeli bombing and destruction machine.

In addition to supporting Israel and its army in its daily massacres against the residents of the Gaza Strip, the activities of the Emirati electronic flies are strongly based on promoting the UAE’s aid and whitewashing its image stained with the shame of normalization.

Among the most prominent electronic fly accounts is an account called “Razan Al-Taweel,” which claims to be a displaced Palestinian writer in Gaza.

She established the aforementioned account in February 2024, but published more than 1,100 tweets, which shows that the account owner has fast and powerful internet connection, unlike the situation in the devastated Gaza Strip.

Another fake account named “Raneem Al-Ali” also appears and identifies her as a Palestinian writer and journalist from Gaza, but what the previous account has in common is the same date of establishment and publication of almost the same tweets and content.

This comes as the UAE is deeply involved in Israel’s vision regarding the day after the war on Gaza as part of Abu Dhabi’s plots to eliminate the Palestinian resistance and impose a unilateral reality on the Palestinians.

The Hebrew Times of Israel website reported that UAE officials have confirmed readiness to participate in a security force in Gaza following the war, and have successfully persuaded Egypt to join as well.

Three informed officials told the Israeli newspaper that US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, during his visits to Qatar, Egypt, Israel and Jordan two weeks ago, informed his interlocutors that the United States had made progress on this issue, as it had received support from Cairo and Abu Dhabi to create a force that would work side by side with Local Palestinian officers.

The newspaper pointed out that the United States is looking to recruit Arab allies for this initiative, as it prepares to present its vision for post-war management in Gaza, although a ceasefire between the Israeli occupation and Hamas is still elusive.

The International Crisis Group stated that the UAE has become isolated internationally due to its alliance and open normalization with Israel, while disregarding the atrocities in Gaza.

 Analyzing the situation, the group emphasized that the UAE’s image has deteriorated across the region since the beginning of the Israeli offensive on Gaza starting October 7, 2023, primarily due to its steadfast commitment to normalization with Tel Aviv.

The international group published a lengthy analysis entitled (The UAE, Israel, and the Test of Influence), in which it highlighted that Abu Dhabi signed the 2020 Abraham Accords with Israel in an effort to achieve strategic benefits.

But during the Gaza war, the costs became clear. Abu Dhabi shows no sign of rethinking normalization, but it may consider smaller steps to register dissatisfaction with the Israeli campaign, according to the international group’s article.

The analysis noted that in 2020, the UAE normalized relations with Israel, making it, along with Bahrain, the first two Arab countries to establish official diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv since Egypt and Jordan signed peace treaties with the Jewish state in 1979 and 1994, respectively.

The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, established the UAE as a strategic ally of Israel, allowing it to potentially leverage its proximity, enhanced communication channels, and the diplomatic goodwill it cultivated to exert influence over Israel.

Initially, Emirati leaders suggested that the agreement would enable them to advocate for a fair resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, although this was not Abu Dhabi’s primary motivation for signing the accords, and it resulted in minimal changes in Israel’s policies towards Palestinians.

Instead, the accords elevated the UAE’s political standing in Washington, improved its reputation in the West, and bolstered trade and arms acquisitions.

From Abu Dhabi’s perspective, the agreements also contributed to regional security, but criticisms mounted over the perceived costs of a deal perceived as detrimental to Palestinian interests, particularly amid the Gaza conflict.

Now, Emirati leaders face a dilemma: they encounter backlash in the Middle East, leading to harassment of UAE citizens in the region, and internal frustration over the government’s silence regarding Gaza’s devastation and abuses, while maintaining steadfast relations with Israel.

The escalation of tensions across the Middle East due to the war also jeopardizes the UAE’s stated goal of peace and interdependence in the region.

The Abraham Accords give the UAE some leverage in signaling dissatisfaction with Israel’s policies in Gaza and raising the costs of its military operations on Israel there.

While there is no indication that Abu Dhabi will go so far as to withdraw from the normalization agreement, it could still, for example, suspend trade with Israel, as Bahrain did.

Taking such actions might not significantly alter Israel’s strategic considerations, but it could raise the stakes of its Gaza operations, amplify global calls to cease hostilities, and mitigate some of the scrutiny directed at Abu Dhabi.

So far, the Emirati leadership has given no indication that it wants to weaken the agreements or jeopardize them in any way, believing that the strategic benefits of the deal outweigh its costs. The question is whether these calculations will hold if the war continues and pressures continue to mount.

The UAE signed the Abraham Accords in September 2020 alongside Bahrain, and Morocco and Sudan also concluded agreements with Israel in October and December 2020, respectively.

The Gulf states have been dealing with Israel on trade and security matters for years, mostly behind the scenes, although Oman and Qatar opened Israeli trade offices in 1996 (only to close them in 2000).

In the five years leading up to the agreements, Emirati and Israeli leaders held confidential meetings to discuss regional security, concerns about Iran, and potential military collaboration.

In 2015, Israel inaugurated its initial diplomatic mission in Abu Dhabi, affiliated with the International Renewable Energy Agency. Three years later, the UAE facilitated talks between Israel and Turkey aimed at restoring their bilateral relations.

Emirati leaders present the Abraham Accords as a move towards a more cohesive Middle East, with the UAE playing a central role. The UAE seeks to bolster regional integration and pursue its vision of a “no problems with neighbors” approach.

This initiative did not resolve all the tensions Abu Dhabi faced with other regional capitals, but it involved efforts to ease tensions with Qatar, Syria, and Turkey while simultaneously forging relations with Israel and Iran.

Emirati officials viewed the agreements as a potential catalyst for “changing the narrative and fostering Arab-Israeli coexistence.”

Enhancing trade, strengthening ties with Washington—particularly under former President Donald Trump’s administration, which vigorously supported the deal—and exploring new avenues of engagement with Israel were all key aspects that attracted the UAE to the agreements.

Emirati leaders viewed these advantages as pivotal in fostering a more peaceful and interconnected region. Additionally, the UAE aimed to demonstrate to the United States its reliability as a long-term regional partner, which facilitated the sale of advanced weapons systems and aircraft.

While Emirati leaders did not primarily sign the agreements to promote a two-state solution or support the Palestinian national cause, they cited these objectives as secondary justifications.

However, from the beginning, it was not clear what price the UAE could impose on Israel on the Palestinian front or how much effort Abu Dhabi would put in to do so.

Emirati leaders asserted they persuaded Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to proceed with his earlier threat in 2020 to formally annex the West Bank. However, Israel maintained that it had only paused the action, continuing its de facto annexation through ongoing settlement expansions.

In 2023, Yousef Al Otaiba, the UAE Ambassador to the United States and chief negotiator of the normalization talks, acknowledged that Israel had committed only to a temporary suspension of the West Bank annexation. This statement contradicted his previous assertion that signing the agreements would immediately halt the annexation.

Palestinian officials criticized the UAE for failing to obtain a binding commitment from Israel and, on the contrary, to help normalize actual annexation.