Study: A complex and increasingly competitive relationship between the UAE and Saudi Arabia

A research study published by the American Middle East Institute highlighted the increasing differences between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in light of a complex and increasingly competitive relationship that brings them together.

The study dealt with the development of Saudi-Emirati relations and the changes that the days brought for them that made them oscillate between friendship and consensus at one time and competition and difference at other times.

It noted that in the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi formed a strategic alliance based on the common interest in ensuring local stability, retaining the seat of government, cordoning off Iranian expansion, and compensating for the United States’ retreat from its perceived role as a guarantor of security in the region.

The two countries established the Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council in 2016, which paved the way for formulating the “Strategy of Resolve,” a shared vision for strengthening economic and military cooperation.

However, several political differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have recently surfaced, which has raised questions about the future shape and direction of the relationship between the two countries.

The joint statement issued after the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Abu Dhabi last December emphasized the deep and lasting friendship between the two countries.

But invoking shared visions hides a complex and increasingly competitive relationship; Saudi Arabia and the UAE seek to diversify their economies, taking advantage of China’s growing capabilities and broad involvement in the Gulf, the Middle East, and East Africa.

The adjustments in Gulf politics that followed in 2011, led by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, focused on reducing the impact of the Arab Spring protests on the Gulf states and their allies in the region (such as Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco) and thwarting Iran’s efforts to exploit the turmoil in the region to establish its hegemony in the region.

Thus, Saudi Arabia and the UAE emerged at the forefront of attempts to ” control and shape the trends of change taking place in the Arab world.” Subsequent policies that pursued these goals were characterized by proactive intervention and a show of force.

Relying on the strong personal relationship between the two de facto rulers, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have orchestrated their use of financial and military power in the Gulf, the Middle East and North Africa, and the Horn of Africa.

The two countries provided economic aid to Jordan and economic and military aid to Bahrain to ensure their loyalty. Other initiatives also included supporting Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s coup in Egypt, imposing a blockade on Qatar in 2017, lobbying against the Iranian nuclear deal, launching a military campaign in Yemen, adopting a hostile stance toward Turkey, cooperating to broker a peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and providing aid and investments to Sudan.

But cracks have appeared in the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi axis over the past two years, and this is not surprising. Of course, even the closest allies have different approaches and priorities.

However, it is important to stress that the recent “consistent and solid friendship” between the two countries is an anomaly. The UAE has long viewed Saudi Arabia as one of its most significant security threats.

The seemingly friendly relations between the two countries have always had hidden tensions. The Treaty of Jeddah, which was set to resolve the border dispute between the two countries, is still controversial.

In the mid-2000s, Saudi Arabia intervened to thwart the sea bridge project linking the Emirates and Qatar and the pipeline project.

Less than a month after the Gulf Cooperation Council approved plans to create a monetary union with a joint central bank based in Riyadh (not Dubai) in 2009, the UAE suddenly announced its withdrawal, and Saudi Arabia responded by temporarily closing the border.

Even when the two countries pursued compatible regional policies, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi perceived different threats, as did their understanding of regional conflicts.

Riyadh is strongly pro-Sunni, while Abu Dhabi is pro-secular, and this difference in attitudes translated into different approaches to dealing with regional crises following the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011.

From the point of view of the UAE leaders, the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliate organizations that adopt political Islam were the biggest threat to the survival of the Gulf kingdoms, which their counterparts in Saudi Arabia did not see, but rather considered Iran as the greatest threat.

As a result, the UAE has been more aggressive in crushing the Muslim Brotherhood and more wary of encircling Iran and limiting its expansion in the region.

In Libya, concern about the rise of political Islam led Abu Dhabi to play a more active operational role than Riyadh, in support of the Libyan military leader, Khalifa Haftar.

Political differences were noticeable in other cases concerning Yemen, for example, and although the two countries entered the conflict entirely, differences soon emerged over the course of the war, during which the two allies supported different local groups.

In July 2019, the UAE reduced the size of its forces in Yemen, which King Salman received “with great anger.” Since then, the two countries have focused on strengthening their positions in strategic areas in Yemen, according to the author.

Over the past two years, the “new era of decisive joint action” has faded; Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi changed tack when their assertive interventionist policies collided with the complex realities of a costly stalemate in Yemen, Moscow’s success in keeping Assad in power, and the growing risk of military confrontation with Iran.