An Israeli official, Yair Golan, praised the “strategic alliance” between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi following a visit to the UAE. The visit aimed to enhance joint efforts with the Emirati government in promoting normalization and combating resistance forces in the region.
Golan, a former Knesset member and deputy chief of the Israeli military, disclosed his meeting with UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan. He described the discussions as a “wonderful dialogue on regional strategy, ending wars, and the return of all hostages,” referring to Israeli prisoners held in Gaza.
In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Golan emphasized the need for a strategic alliance to counter Iran, which he described as the “head of the octopus,” particularly after the October 7 attack by Palestinian resistance forces.
The agreements are expected to “change the narrative and make [Arab-Israeli] coexistence possible,” according to an Emirati official.
Enhancing trade, strengthening ties with Washington—which had strongly pushed for the deal under former President Donald Trump—and exploring new avenues of engagement with Israel were among the key attractions of the accords.
Emirati leaders believe these benefits will help establish a more peaceful and interconnected region. More importantly, the UAE also sent a clear message to the United States that it is a reliable and long-term regional partner, which proved instrumental in unlocking the sale of advanced weapon systems and aircraft.
The Emirati leadership did not primarily sign the accords as a means to advance a two-state solution or support the Palestinian cause, although these goals were cited as additional justifications.
From the outset, however, it was unclear what leverage the UAE could exert over Israel regarding the Palestinian issue or how much effort Abu Dhabi was willing to invest in this regard.
Emirati leaders claimed to have persuaded Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2020 to refrain from acting on his earlier threat to formally annex the West Bank. However, Israel asserted that it had merely suspended the move temporarily, continuing its de facto annexation through expanded settlement construction.
In 2023, UAE Ambassador to the United States, Yousef Al Otaiba, who played a leading role in the normalization talks, admitted that Israel had only agreed to a temporary halt to annexation, contradicting his earlier statement that signing the accords “immediately” stopped annexation.
Palestinian officials criticized the UAE for failing to secure a binding commitment from Israel and, instead, aiding in normalizing the de facto annexation.
Reaction from Gaza
Criticism of the normalization agreements intensified during the war launched by Israel on Gaza. In interviews with the International Crisis Group and media outlets, Emirati and other Arab opinion-makers pointed out that leaders of states that normalized relations with Israel, including the UAE, believed the Palestinian issue could be sidelined in Arab-Israeli relations, highlighting how shortsighted such a perspective is.
Since October 7, the UAE’s image has worsened across the region.
A poll conducted by the Arab Center in Washington, DC, in January 2024 found that 67% of respondents in 16 Arabic-speaking countries viewed the UAE’s approach to the Gaza war as bad or very bad.
The growing anti-UAE sentiment in the region poses challenges for a country that prioritizes its image. The government is concerned about reports of harassment and verbal abuse of Emirati citizens traveling to other parts of the Middle East due to the UAE’s relationship with Israel.
If regional reactions weren’t troubling enough for the Emirati leadership, it is also facing frustration domestically over the normalization agreements.
Prominent Emiratis who once supported the deal now say they no longer back this relationship. “Israel has embarrassed the signatories [to the agreements]. Netanyahu hasn’t frozen settlement expansion as promised,” said one.
A regional policy analyst from the UAE explained, “Israel doesn’t care, and now there’s a backlash in public opinion. Resentment toward the UAE’s approach is reaching a boiling point, becoming a topic of discussion on social media, during Friday prayers, and at dinner gatherings.”
An Emirati academic remarked, “The war is dragging on and leaving a bitter taste in our mouths.” Another noted that “[the leadership’s] focus is on doing everything possible to avoid criticism.” Even Emirati officials acknowledge the “rising discontent.”
The UAE has traditionally been confident in its ability to manage episodes of internal discontent without relying on democratic representation. However, as the war continues, it may feel pressured to do more to appease public sentiment.
The war has brought additional challenges for UAE leaders. Among Abu Dhabi’s main strategic objectives are regional stability and enhancing “connectivity” between regions, particularly strengthening ties with Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.
While UAE policies do not always align with these goals (Abu Dhabi, for instance, has been widely accused of fueling the civil war in Sudan), it is clear that Emirati leaders aim to expand trade relations, with the UAE serving as a hub for commerce and logistics.
The periodic violence in Israel and Palestine, which often spills across borders, poses a significant obstacle to these ambitions. Examples of this harmful spillover include attacks by Houthi militants in Yemen on ships in the Red Sea—a key regional trade route.
“This war and the risk of escalation are affecting our connectivity agenda,” an Emirati security expert commented.
UAE Leaders Defend Ties with Israel
Emirati leaders continue to defend their relationship with Israel, arguing that it enables them, at the very least, to assist those in need.
“We haven’t abandoned the Palestinians. Our ties with Israel have allowed us to mobilize and provide humanitarian aid quickly,” an Emirati businessman told the International Crisis Group.
Within a week of the war’s outbreak, the UAE dispatched a plane carrying medical supplies to Al-Arish in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and allocated over $34 million to support Gaza.
Over the past six months, the UAE has evacuated children for medical care, established a field and maritime hospital, and constructed a water desalination plant to address the water shortage in Gaza.
When Western donors suspended funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)—the primary organization providing aid and assistance to Palestinian refugees—due to the alleged involvement of 12 staff members in a Hamas attack, Abu Dhabi doubled its contributions to the agency.
The UAE believes that the direct line it has with Israel, thanks to the Abraham Accords, has proven beneficial. “We’ve been leveraging normalization and our relationship with Israel to help [alleviate] the humanitarian situation,” an Emirati official told Crisis, emphasizing that this achievement suffices for now.
However, Israel’s attack on the World Central Kitchen—the UAE’s humanitarian partner in Gaza—on April 2 underscored the limitations of the accords in safeguarding Emirati humanitarian efforts.
The UAE also views its official relationship with Israel as a strong foundation to contribute to Gaza’s post-war reconstruction and long-term conflict resolution efforts.
Abu Dhabi has made it clear that it will not finance reconstruction unless there is a “viable plan for a two-state solution.”
Supporters of maintaining ties argue that this is not “moral normalization” but, as one Emirati academic put it, a way to ensure that “Israel sees itself connected to the rest of the region.”
From the UAE’s perspective, stronger relationships between Israel and Arab nations in the region would make Israel feel less threatened and, in turn, more willing to address the Palestinian issue in a way that provides a lasting resolution to the conflict.
However, without progress toward establishing a Palestinian state or at least ending the war in Gaza, the backlash may intensify, making it increasingly challenging to sustain the relationship with Israel.
