Emirates Leaks

Israeli Official Boasts About “Strategic Alliance” with the UAE

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An Israeli official, Yair Golan, praised the “strategic alliance” between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi following a visit to the UAE. The visit aimed to enhance joint efforts with the Emirati government in promoting normalization and combating resistance forces in the region.

Golan, a former Knesset member and deputy chief of the Israeli military, disclosed his meeting with UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan. He described the discussions as a “wonderful dialogue on regional strategy, ending wars, and the return of all hostages,” referring to Israeli prisoners held in Gaza.

In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Golan emphasized the need for a strategic alliance to counter Iran, which he described as the “head of the octopus,” particularly after the October 7 attack by Palestinian resistance forces.

The agreements are expected to “change the narrative and make [Arab-Israeli] coexistence possible,” according to an Emirati official.

Enhancing trade, strengthening ties with Washington—which had strongly pushed for the deal under former President Donald Trump—and exploring new avenues of engagement with Israel were among the key attractions of the accords.

Emirati leaders believe these benefits will help establish a more peaceful and interconnected region. More importantly, the UAE also sent a clear message to the United States that it is a reliable and long-term regional partner, which proved instrumental in unlocking the sale of advanced weapon systems and aircraft.

The Emirati leadership did not primarily sign the accords as a means to advance a two-state solution or support the Palestinian cause, although these goals were cited as additional justifications.

From the outset, however, it was unclear what leverage the UAE could exert over Israel regarding the Palestinian issue or how much effort Abu Dhabi was willing to invest in this regard.

Emirati leaders claimed to have persuaded Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2020 to refrain from acting on his earlier threat to formally annex the West Bank. However, Israel asserted that it had merely suspended the move temporarily, continuing its de facto annexation through expanded settlement construction.

In 2023, UAE Ambassador to the United States, Yousef Al Otaiba, who played a leading role in the normalization talks, admitted that Israel had only agreed to a temporary halt to annexation, contradicting his earlier statement that signing the accords “immediately” stopped annexation.

Palestinian officials criticized the UAE for failing to secure a binding commitment from Israel and, instead, aiding in normalizing the de facto annexation.

Reaction from Gaza

Criticism of the normalization agreements intensified during the war launched by Israel on Gaza. In interviews with the International Crisis Group and media outlets, Emirati and other Arab opinion-makers pointed out that leaders of states that normalized relations with Israel, including the UAE, believed the Palestinian issue could be sidelined in Arab-Israeli relations, highlighting how shortsighted such a perspective is.

Since October 7, the UAE’s image has worsened across the region.

A poll conducted by the Arab Center in Washington, DC, in January 2024 found that 67% of respondents in 16 Arabic-speaking countries viewed the UAE’s approach to the Gaza war as bad or very bad.

The growing anti-UAE sentiment in the region poses challenges for a country that prioritizes its image. The government is concerned about reports of harassment and verbal abuse of Emirati citizens traveling to other parts of the Middle East due to the UAE’s relationship with Israel.

If regional reactions weren’t troubling enough for the Emirati leadership, it is also facing frustration domestically over the normalization agreements.

Prominent Emiratis who once supported the deal now say they no longer back this relationship. “Israel has embarrassed the signatories [to the agreements]. Netanyahu hasn’t frozen settlement expansion as promised,” said one.

A regional policy analyst from the UAE explained, “Israel doesn’t care, and now there’s a backlash in public opinion. Resentment toward the UAE’s approach is reaching a boiling point, becoming a topic of discussion on social media, during Friday prayers, and at dinner gatherings.”

An Emirati academic remarked, “The war is dragging on and leaving a bitter taste in our mouths.” Another noted that “[the leadership’s] focus is on doing everything possible to avoid criticism.” Even Emirati officials acknowledge the “rising discontent.”

The UAE has traditionally been confident in its ability to manage episodes of internal discontent without relying on democratic representation. However, as the war continues, it may feel pressured to do more to appease public sentiment.

The war has brought additional challenges for UAE leaders. Among Abu Dhabi’s main strategic objectives are regional stability and enhancing “connectivity” between regions, particularly strengthening ties with Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

While UAE policies do not always align with these goals (Abu Dhabi, for instance, has been widely accused of fueling the civil war in Sudan), it is clear that Emirati leaders aim to expand trade relations, with the UAE serving as a hub for commerce and logistics.

The periodic violence in Israel and Palestine, which often spills across borders, poses a significant obstacle to these ambitions. Examples of this harmful spillover include attacks by Houthi militants in Yemen on ships in the Red Sea—a key regional trade route.

“This war and the risk of escalation are affecting our connectivity agenda,” an Emirati security expert commented.

UAE Leaders Defend Ties with Israel

Emirati leaders continue to defend their relationship with Israel, arguing that it enables them, at the very least, to assist those in need.

“We haven’t abandoned the Palestinians. Our ties with Israel have allowed us to mobilize and provide humanitarian aid quickly,” an Emirati businessman told the International Crisis Group.

Within a week of the war’s outbreak, the UAE dispatched a plane carrying medical supplies to Al-Arish in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and allocated over $34 million to support Gaza.

Over the past six months, the UAE has evacuated children for medical care, established a field and maritime hospital, and constructed a water desalination plant to address the water shortage in Gaza.

When Western donors suspended funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)—the primary organization providing aid and assistance to Palestinian refugees—due to the alleged involvement of 12 staff members in a Hamas attack, Abu Dhabi doubled its contributions to the agency.

The UAE believes that the direct line it has with Israel, thanks to the Abraham Accords, has proven beneficial. “We’ve been leveraging normalization and our relationship with Israel to help [alleviate] the humanitarian situation,” an Emirati official told Crisis, emphasizing that this achievement suffices for now.

However, Israel’s attack on the World Central Kitchen—the UAE’s humanitarian partner in Gaza—on April 2 underscored the limitations of the accords in safeguarding Emirati humanitarian efforts.

The UAE also views its official relationship with Israel as a strong foundation to contribute to Gaza’s post-war reconstruction and long-term conflict resolution efforts.

Abu Dhabi has made it clear that it will not finance reconstruction unless there is a “viable plan for a two-state solution.”

Supporters of maintaining ties argue that this is not “moral normalization” but, as one Emirati academic put it, a way to ensure that “Israel sees itself connected to the rest of the region.”

From the UAE’s perspective, stronger relationships between Israel and Arab nations in the region would make Israel feel less threatened and, in turn, more willing to address the Palestinian issue in a way that provides a lasting resolution to the conflict.

However, without progress toward establishing a Palestinian state or at least ending the war in Gaza, the backlash may intensify, making it increasingly challenging to sustain the relationship with Israel.

A Growing Influence?

The Abraham Accords have fostered expanding and increasingly diverse relations between the UAE and Israel, raising questions about whether the UAE wields greater influence over Israel and how it might leverage this influence.

Many now describe the UAE as Israel’s primary lifeline to the Arab world.

The UAE’s national airline is one of the few Middle Eastern carriers offering direct flights to Tel Aviv, and Abu Dhabi has established a land route connecting the UAE to Israel. This route helps Israel offset trade losses caused by Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Since 2020, ties between the two countries have grown rapidly in finance, agriculture, energy, and technology, making the UAE Israel’s second-largest trading partner in the Middle East, following Turkey.

The two nations have worked diligently to create an environment conducive to mutual investment. Their central banks have a cooperation agreement, and a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement allows Emirati and Israeli companies to operate seamlessly in each other’s markets.

This agreement, alongside a visa exemption deal—the first and only such arrangement between Israel and an Arab country—has attracted Israeli investors to the Gulf state.

By 2023, 1,000 Israeli companies were operating in the UAE. In the largest deal to date, the UAE’s sovereign wealth fund acquired a 22% stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field in the Mediterranean for $1 billion.

The UAE has also become a major source of investment in Israeli technology firms. Abu Dhabi-based technology company G42, led by UAE National Security Advisor Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan, opened its first international office in Israel.

Amid the Gaza war, as Israel’s economy shrank by nearly 20% in the final quarter of 2023, this commercial lifeline has become increasingly critical.

The UAE and Israel also collaborate extensively in the security sector. They conduct joint naval drills and co-develop advanced weapon systems.

Israel has sold weapons to the UAE, including advanced air defense systems. In 2022, Israel supplied Rafael-made SPYDER mobile interceptors to the UAE to protect against drone attacks. This followed Houthi strikes on Abu Dhabi’s airport and an ADNOC facility in January 2022, which killed three people.

In 2021, Israel Aerospace Industries and the UAE’s EDGE Group launched a project to develop unmanned surface vessels, marking another significant milestone in their defense cooperation.

The UAE and Israel share a vision emphasizing the importance of continued deep U.S. engagement in the Middle East. In 2021, Israel’s transfer from the U.S. European Command to the U.S. Central Command provided a platform for greater security discussions and coordination among the U.S., Israel, and Gulf Arab states.