Responsible Statecraft: U.S. guarantees to the U.A.E. Security enforce dictatorship

Responsible Statecraft said that if rumours of a new arrangement with Abu Dhabi are accurate, it would not only strengthen the U.S. position in the region but also reward a hostile actor in the region.

The Biden administration is negotiating a new arrangement with the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) that would include additional U.S. strategic security guarantees for Abu Dhabi’s client government.

If the rumours are accurate, this would be another step in the wrong direction for U.S. Middle East policy. A new security pact with the U.A.E. would be more evidence that the administration’s “back to basics” strategy to the region is nothing more than catering to client states and making additional unneeded commitments to them.

Despite the United Arab Emirates’ government’s disruptive regional actions and attempts to intervene in our domestic affairs, the disputed security deal provides the U.A.E. with enhanced U.S. protection. If the United States grants security guarantees to the U.A.E., Vice President Biden will repeat the mistakes of his predecessors by “reassuring” a bad regional actor at the expense of the United States.

The past several months are a cautionary story illustrating how regional client governments use the United States and demand greater concessions by whining about Washington’s perceived neglect. The United States already goes above and beyond to assist Abu Dhabi with protection, and the Biden administration has practically rushed jets and ships to prevent future Houthi attacks. This was evidently too slow, which is why their envoy reportedly abstained from voting on the Security Council resolution condemning the invasion of Ukraine.

Mohamed bin Zayed also refused to answer the president’s calls and disrespected the visiting U.S. Centcom commander. As if the U.A.E. were the elder partner in the relationship and our government required their consent, the Biden administration has responded to this obstinacy by playing the sycophant. This embarrassing spectacle will undoubtedly continue when the president attends the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) conference in Riyadh later this month.

In the past few months, proponents of a tighter connection with the U.A.E. have conducted a pressure campaign against the administration in an effort to urge the U.S. to heal ties with Abu Dhabi, and the administration has been quick to comply. Even though the U.S. is under no duty to do anything for the U.A.E., its supporters assume that any split in the relationship is our government’s fault and that it is our responsibility to mend it.

Unfortunately, a vast majority of our government’s policymakers hold this view and act accordingly. If U.S. and U.A.E. interests diverge, as they frequently do today, it is not the role of our government to sacrifice American interests to fill the void.

Extending security guarantees to the U.A.E. could make some sense if the U.A.E. had demonstrated in recent years that it is a valuable and productive partner, but this is not the case. The U.A.E. has worked against U.S. interests and destabilised other nations by supporting its favoured warlord in Libya, carving out a sphere of influence in Yemen, providing U.S.-made weaponry to its proxies in violation of their agreements, and opposing the nuclear deal with Iran.

Gregg Carlstrom recently remarked, in light of this record, that it was “amazing that the U.A.E. could spend a decade acting in opposition to America’s professed interests in the Middle East and still receive a symbolic defence contract.” Rarely has the adage that the United States stands for Uncle Sucker been more appropriate.

Since quite some time, the U.A.E. has desired a stronger formal security commitment from the United States. Mohamed bin Zayed, who was just appointed to U.A.E. president following the death of his half-brother Khalifa, discussed his interest in a formal security partnership with David Ignatius last October.

Since then, the notion of providing the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia with stronger security guarantees has been circulating in Washington. At least with regard to the U.A.E., the Biden administration appears to have been amenable to this concept. The nuclear negotiations with Iran have provided another occasion for the U.A.E. to demand more from the United States, as their and Israel’s governments have been campaigning for more guarantees in the event that the nuclear deal is resurrected.

The primary argument against extending U.S. commitment to the U.A.E. is that it would be damaging to American interests and would simply encourage the U.A.E. administration to be more reckless. The last time the United States intended to “reassure” its Gulf Arab patrons of its support, it began assisting in the destruction of Yemen. Despite years of unwavering U.S. support for this heinous conflict, the Saudi and Emirati governments continue to complain that the United States is unreliable.

No matter what the United States has supplied these countries in the past, it has never been sufficient. Whatever the Biden administration currently gives them will just enhance their desire for more. In obedience to the wishes of its clients, the United States renounced the nuclear deal and escalated tensions with Iran during the Trump administration, illustrating just how hazardous this trend of granting client requests can be. During his presidency, if Biden makes appeasing the Saudis and the U.A.E. a top priority, he will face comparable risks.

The last decade has offered ample proof that Washington’s willingness to arm and support the U.A.E. and other customers in the region only exacerbates regional instability and violence. Continued U.S. support for authoritarian clients in the region implicates our government in their numerous human rights violations within and outside their borders. Foreign policy frequently necessitates disagreeable trade-offs, but in this instance, the United States appears to receive nothing of value in exchange for its reflexive support.

Instead of adding another commitment to defend the U.A.E., the United States should examine ways to downgrade the relationship and minimise its support to the greatest extent practicable. The withdrawal of newly deployed U.S. forces would be an excellent starting point.

Future U.S. involvement in new conflicts may be necessitated by U.A.E. security promises. It would likely entail maintaining a considerably greater military presence in the region than is required by U.S. interests. At a time when the United States has relatively few interests in the Middle East and must focus its attention elsewhere, a greater commitment to the United Arab Emirates is precisely what the United States does not need and should not offer.

At best, it is a waste of time and resources, and at worst, it could drag the United States into another pointless conflict. It is easy to understand how the U.A.E. would benefit from such an arrangement, while the United States would be saddled with yet another unwanted responsibility.