UAE: The Gateway for Israel’s Survival Amid Its Ambitions and Aggression in the Arab Region

The UAE is positioned as a gateway for Israel’s survival amid its ambitions and aggression in the Arab region. The occupation sees Abu Dhabi as its ally for regional expansion, following its deep entanglement in widespread conflicts, particularly concerning the future of the Palestinian state.

One year after the Palestinian resistance’s “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation—an event that radically altered the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and dispelled the long-held belief in Israel’s “invincibility”—Abu Dhabi emerges as a key supporter of the occupation, offering political, military, economic, and even media assistance to obscure its actions in the Palestinian territories.

Observers note that the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation has significantly unsettled the occupation and its Western backers, exposing critical vulnerabilities in Israel’s military readiness, intelligence capabilities, and overall strategic perspective. The ensuing brutal conflict has reshaped Israel’s standing in the region and its relationships with both allies and rivals.

On a deeper level, the year following the attack has reinforced a fundamental reality: “Israel must establish a new path for its security as the foundations of its old security framework have collapsed.”

Carlos Rojas, an American researcher at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, states: “Instead, Israel should adopt a strategy centered on regional economic integration that aligns with the interests of its neighbors, reduces tensions, and creates a framework for long-term stability.”

The opposition Emirati website (uae71) stated that in discussions about the economic and regional integration of the Israeli occupation, the “normalization agreement” with Abu Dhabi becomes prominent. This agreement is maintained by political leaders in Abu Dhabi despite the ongoing massacres and war crimes in Gaza, representing the only glimmer of hope for the occupation’s survival as its old security foundations crumble.

There are three main pillars that the occupation has relied on over the past seventy years:

The first pillar is “internal unity”: The capacity of a diverse community from across the globe, united by the Jewish faith, to remain cohesive against external threats was crucial for survival. However, political polarization and demographic shifts within the society have altered this situation. The increasing prominence of Arab voices prior to the brutal war on Gaza, alongside the new generation of occupiers who refuse military service, and the clear political polarization evident in the constitutional crisis, underscore these changes.

The second pillar is “Arab division”: The Israeli occupation has taken advantage of rivalries and divisions among Arab states, hindering the establishment of a united front against it. However, regional dynamics have changed, affecting this strategy. Armed groups supported by Iran—each with their own goals—have become significant actors in the recent conflict, eclipsing the Arab regimes that were publicly normalizing relations with the occupation, like Abu Dhabi, or doing so behind the scenes.

The third pillar is “Western support”: Support from the West, especially the United States and Europe, has been fundamental to Israel’s security. However, the recent war has led to a decline in this support among various segments of American and European society.

Over the past year, thousands have been demonstrating weekly against Israeli war crimes in Gaza. Citizens have pressured their parliaments and political parties to adopt positions that were previously unthinkable, leading several nations to announce recognition of the Palestinian state. Consequently, Israel has faced increased isolation in many of its traditional supporter countries, and this trend is likely to continue in the near future.

Abu Dhabi at the Heart of Israel’s New Strategy

The brutal war on Gaza has led Arab leaders who normalized relations to reassess those connections, with the notable exception of Abu Dhabi. Jordan recalled its ambassador in the month following the aggression, while Egyptian officials cautioned that any attempt to transfer Gaza residents to Sinai could threaten the historic “Camp David” peace treaty. Additionally, Bahrain and Morocco suspended all interactions with the occupation.

Since the normalization announcement, Abu Dhabi has been Israel’s only gateway in the region, justified by the notion of “regional economic integration.” This new strategy suggests that Israel considers such integration vital for its survival as its old security foundations crumble.

Politically, the UAE is regarded as a middle power in the region. Its expanding soft power over the past decade, alongside strong diplomatic ties, offers the Israeli occupation a chance to secure recognition and acceptance beyond its immediate surroundings while overlooking the Palestinian issue. This has been evident in Abu Dhabi’s efforts to broaden the so-called “Abraham Accords” to encompass Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, as well as to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia and Mauritania.

Militarily, Abu Dhabi, Washington, and the Israeli occupation concur on the need for a new joint defense structure (similar to a NATO for the Middle East) to address Iran’s regional influence and its nuclear program, which the Israeli government views as existential threats. The Israeli Defense Minister has even termed this initiative “MEAD.”

Israel’s main objective is to create a collective air defense system, leveraging the military capabilities of its Arab allies, which offers three specific advantages, as noted by the International Crisis Group. From a strictly military standpoint, this would enable access to existing sensors in Gulf states, giving Israelis additional time to prepare for any Iranian attack.

Secondly, establishing a coalition would enhance the perception that Israel’s military options are increasing, thereby bolstering its deterrent capabilities.

Finally, the coalition could strengthen political alliances and enhance Israel’s acceptance in Gulf countries and the broader Middle East.

Economically, Abu Dhabi has provided the opportunity to lift the occupation out of its economic isolation in a region that imposes bans on Israeli goods. Over time, this could lead to greater acceptance—at least as Israeli officials envision. According to the comprehensive economic agreement, Israeli products can use the UAE’s ports for re-export under the UAE brand, allowing Israeli goods to penetrate the Arab world despite the existing ban.

Abu Dhabi has declined to halt trade with the Israeli occupation. In 2023, trade exchanges approached $3 billion, reflecting a 17% increase from the previous year. Although there was a slowdown in 2023, especially in the last quarter due to the Israeli aggression in Gaza, trade swiftly picked up again in the current year.

In the first six months of 2024, the “volume of bilateral trade reached $1.66 billion, marking a 7% increase compared to the first half of 2023.” This stands in stark contrast to Israel’s total trade with the outside world, which has declined by 18%.

Abu Dhabi and Israel also collaborate on regional projects, such as energy and infrastructure initiatives, including a solar energy project with Jordan. This represents another facet of enhancing Israeli acceptance in the region.

The Need for Abu Dhabi in the Aftermath of the War

Following the occupation’s war on Gaza, there will be a significant need for Abu Dhabi to forge new relationships in the region, acting as a means of reputation laundering for the occupation’s actions in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon. This effort will be promoted under the guise of “economic integration,” spurred by the urgent need for Arab governments to foster economic recovery amid escalating economic crises.

During the brutal aggression on Gaza, Abu Dhabi consistently engaged in this form of reputation laundering by discussing humanitarian aid bridges and the delivery of assistance, all while the population faced an ongoing humanitarian blockade.

Since the beginning of UAE-Israeli normalization, Abu Dhabi has actively sought to maximize benefits from its relationship with the occupation, particularly in the fields of technology and arms investments, as well as economic exchanges. This push has been met with enthusiasm from Israelis, culminating in failed attempts at popular normalization in the UAE—something that Egypt and Jordan have consistently opposed, despite their long-standing normalization and economic needs.

This is due to Israel’s strategy of “creating mutual dependencies” through its economic policies. Essentially, if Israel’s economy is harmed by conflict, the economies of its partners will also suffer, making it in their interest to prioritize “Israel’s security and stability,” even at the cost of Palestinian and Arab rights. This approach supports ambitions to expand the occupation at the expense of neighboring Arab countries and to realize the goals of a “Greater Israel.”

Israel perceives Abu Dhabi’s role as instrumental in enhancing its national security by drawing normalization countries into intertwined economic relationships, thereby decreasing the chances of conflict. This arrangement also helps Israel address threats, similar to Abu Dhabi’s support after the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” contributing to what the United States and Israel call “economic peace.”

If Abu Dhabi can successfully open the path for Israeli occupation in other countries in the region through economic integration—as both Abu Dhabi and the occupation refer to it—it would diversify the occupation’s alliances, decreasing its reliance on Western powers by building economic partnerships with Arab nations. This shift would also diminish the potential effects of changes to the third pillar of Israel’s old security foundations, which are likely to intensify in the near future.

The Future of Abu Dhabi in Israel’s Strategy

Regional integration has become the only viable path for Israel, necessitating the normalization of its relations with countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, and requiring difficult concessions regarding the Palestinian issue.

Arab nations, especially Saudi Arabia, insist that any “regional integration” cannot succeed without resolving the Palestinian issue, which Abu Dhabi has downplayed—despite maintaining an official stance that still acknowledges it. The “Al-Aqsa Flood” has re-emphasized this issue, shaping Arab countries’ relations with the Israeli occupation. However, Netanyahu’s government dismisses any conversation about a two-state solution, deeming it “anti-Semitic.”

The occupation is entangled in disagreements over how to handle the Palestinian issue, obstructing any progress toward integration. While Israelis find it hard to accept this situation today, the global consensus views it as an unavoidable and essential route for Netanyahu’s government after the “Al-Aqsa Flood.”

Saudi Arabia has made it clear that the two-state solution and recognition of a Palestinian state are prerequisites for normalizing relations with the occupation and participating in “regional integration.” This position is consistent among all Arab countries and most of the world, complicating Abu Dhabi’s efforts to back Israeli initiatives in the region and forcing both Abu Dhabi and Israel into a state of isolation—a condition that has seemingly become second nature for the state over the past year. Consequently, we will bear a heavy cost politically and economically.