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What went wrong in UAE-US ties?

The UAE-US alliance has traditionally been solid, but it is now being put to the test.

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The UAE has maintained a close connection with the US since its foundation. This is still true, notwithstanding current difficulties with President Joseph R. Biden Jr.

The US was among the first to recognize the UAE in December 1971. Three months later, Ambassador William A. Stoltzfus was dispatched to the UAE to prepare for the inauguration of the US Embassy in 1974.

Since then, the UAE-US partnership has been solid. 23% increase in bilateral trade. Moreover, the UAE has joined US-led military operations in Kuwait, Afghanistan, Serbia, Iraq, and the NATO-led campaign in Libya. Deep security cooperation on counterterrorism, from information sharing to deradicalization initiatives, is included.

This history of strong relationships contrasts with the current rhetoric in the US media surrounding the UAE relationship — that it is at an all-time low or even in crisis due to the UAE rejecting Biden and siding with Russia over the US alliance. Regardless, the present partnership has been put to the test.

How Did It Happen?

The relationship has had its ups and downs, but the present problems are based on the US strategic change with the Obama administration’s “pivot East” foreign strategy. To match China’s potential as the world’s greatest economy, many US officials and policy experts believe the US must pivot away from the Middle East while reducing perceived security costs and responsibilities.

The finalization of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran in 2015, without input of the Gulf Cooperation Council, was seen as a move to minimize US security commitment in the Middle East. These governments felt that focusing only on Iran’s nuclear programme was a squandered chance to rein in Iranian-backed militia organizations’ disruptive actions. Acknowledging Iranian proxies like the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq and turning a blind eye to Iran’s mobilization of Shia movements like the Zeinabiyoun Brigade from Pakistan and the Fatemiyoun Division from Afghanistan to fight ISIL in Syria was a sign of a shift in the security architecture that allowed Iranian-backed militias more freedom to operate. But the US cutbacks went further. Instead of enforcing a no-fly zone, handing Russia the Syria file was a massive rearrangement of security responsibilities that gave both Russia and Iran a new position in the area.

The greatest blow was the US stance on the Iranian-backed Houthi war in Yemen. After taking Sanaa, the Houthis attacked Aden and threatened Saudi Arabia. The US Embassy in Sanaa remained open for a month after the Houthis’ takeover of the capital, which some saw as legitimizing the Houthis. The Obama administration aided the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen to build its “burden sharing” or “do it yourself” regional security strategy. This broke with the Carter Doctrine and the US pledge to the GCC nations established in 1945 onboard the USS Quincy by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz al-Saud. To remove Patriot missiles from Saudi Arabia in June 2021, when the kingdom faced Houthi drone and missile assaults, may have been the Carter Doctrine’s last nail.

For many GCC-US ties, the Biden administration’s treatment of Saudi Arabia was the most confusing and detrimental. The administration appears to let the media and legislative outcry to the assassination of Saudi writer Jamal Khashoggi preclude any genuine attempt to restore the relationship. The notion that the US no longer took its alliance with Saudi Arabia – or its Gulf security responsibilities – seriously fueled the view.

Biden’s Middle East strategy was centred on the JCPOA until oil prices skyrocketed. A decision by the administration to remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps off the list of foreign terrorist groups was considered as an incentive to speed up the return of Iranian oil to the market.

World Order Clash

But the shifts go beyond US Middle East strategy. They also shape the global order. After the dissolution of the USSR, the US-led unipolar international order ushered in globalization, which Russia and China followed. The GCC nations have aggressively embraced globalization. The region’s whole post-oil growth ambitions rely on global economic connectedness. But this globalized international order is under jeopardy! The Biden administration’s reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine resurrects the 1990s bipolar global order. Anyone who believes in foreign investment and a global economy is worried about the present use of sanctions, asset seizures, and asset freezes. Investing in a global networked economy appears to be disappearing as one government seeks to turn back the clock 35 years.

Globalization is a concept that the UAE has adopted across its whole economic and diplomatic system. It’s all about the US-created global order, from Emirates Airlines to the Abraham Accords. It is a tremendous disturbance to return to the Cold War. Buying F-35 fighter fighters from the UAE would mean returning to a binary system of allies and adversaries, which runs opposed to the way the rest of the world views commercial interactions, which is why the UAE halted negotiations. But extending it to China, like deploying Huawei’s 5G network, would be a clear and present risk to global connectivity….

Can Change Come?

One of the main outcomes of the Abraham Accords was the reassessment of the threat matrix. Improving collaboration on airspace use, military drills, and cultural interaction have become more commonplace as Israel has gone from “enemy” to “friend.” And, with leadership and vision, previously inconceivable or difficult possibilities may become a reality.

Even though both the US Central Command and the 5th Fleet are stationed in GCC nations, there is currently no formal security partnership between the US and the GCC. So, the US-GCC relationship may need to be redefined to determine whether they are really allies. On the other hand, the Biden administration may use the current crisis to review the relationship and its usefulness to both sides, comparable to the Roosevelt-King Abdulaziz accord.

For this alliance to be successful, it will need to include both the US and the GCC’s future plans. This involves concerns such as artificial intelligence, global connection, and digital existence. Despite variances in priority and implementation pace, all GCC nations share these aims. A common vision of the future is essential for long-term US-GCC cooperation.

An example of this reframing of ties may be the “T-20” initiative, which brought together top think tanks and research institutes from the G-20. For more strategic depth and clarity, institutions in both the US and the GCC might convene periodically to define a common agenda for the next 50 years.