The Hidden Power Struggle Between Egypt and the UAE in Sudan
Amid Sudan’s devastating civil war, a less visible yet equally significant power struggle is unfolding between two regional forces: Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.
Egypt supports the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), while the UAE backs the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the conflict that erupted on April 15, 2023. Nearly two years of fighting have led to a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, pushing Sudan toward total collapse.
In its final days, the Biden administration imposed sanctions on both RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) for commanding forces responsible for genocide and SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan for obstructing peace efforts, blocking aid, and allegedly using chemical weapons.
Despite growing evidence from UN and U.S. investigators of the UAE’s deep involvement in supporting the RSF, Abu Dhabi continues to claim neutrality as a humanitarian actor. However, this claim has been directly challenged at the highest levels of the U.S. government.
During his Senate confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly accused the UAE of “supporting an entity that is openly committing genocide.”
Egypt’s Growing Support for the Sudanese Army
Egypt’s role in backing the SAF and the military-led government in Port Sudan has become increasingly apparent.
In September, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Aty emphasized “the importance of not equating the national Sudanese army with any other party.” More recently, he reaffirmed Egypt’s commitment to “supporting the capabilities of the Sudanese army” in coordination with emerging security partners in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea, and Somalia.
Despite their alignment on most regional issues, Egypt and the UAE find themselves on opposing sides in Sudan’s war.
After coming to power in 2013 following the military’s overthrow of the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood government, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi relied on Gulf states—especially the UAE—for economic support.
The UAE recently deepened its economic ties with Egypt through a historic $35 billion investment in developing Ras El Hekma on the Mediterranean for tourism, providing a crucial financial lifeline to Sisi’s administration.
However, despite this massive investment, Egypt remains at odds with Abu Dhabi’s approach to Sudan. For Cairo, the Sudanese military—not the RSF—represents the key to stability along its southern border. This view is reinforced by refugee movement patterns: a significant number of Sudanese refugees have fled north to Egypt.
Egypt’s Existential Stakes in Sudan
Egypt faces existential risks in Sudan’s ongoing turmoil. Since April 2023, Egypt has managed the influx of over 1.2 million Sudanese refugees, now the largest refugee community in the country. A total state collapse in Sudan could send millions more across the border.
Additionally, Egypt’s water security is at stake. The power vacuum in Sudan has severely weakened Cairo’s negotiating position with Ethiopia, its longtime rival in the Nile Basin.
For better or worse, Sudan has historically been a key ally for Egypt in countering the threat posed by Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). In a recent statement, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef reinforced this alliance, vowing that “Sudan will stand with Egypt” and ominously hinting that war remains an option if no agreement is reached.
However, as Sudan descends into deeper civil conflict, weakening Egypt’s negotiating leverage, Nile Basin countries have seized the opportunity to advance their interests.
In a major development, the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) came into effect recently after South Sudan’s unexpected accession in July.
This agreement challenges the colonial-era treaties that had long favored Egypt and Sudan, introducing the principle of “equitable use,” which significantly benefits upstream nations like Ethiopia.
Faced with its deteriorating position on the Nile, Egypt has pivoted toward building a regional security network surrounding Ethiopia. Cairo has forged security alliances with Somalia and Eritrea, with Egypt’s foreign minister stating that this alliance will be leveraged to help the Sudanese army combat “terrorism.”
The UAE’s Strategic Setback in Sudan
Despite its extensive backing of the RSF, the UAE’s strategic objectives in Sudan have suffered significant setbacks due to the paramilitary group’s failure to seize full control of the country.
Abu Dhabi’s strategy centered on exploiting Sudan’s gold trade and enhancing its food security through state-linked land acquisitions.
A key element of this plan was the development of the $6 billion Abu Amama Port on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Designed to connect agricultural zones with an export terminal, the port aligned with the UAE’s broader regional maritime strategy, complementing its port operations in neighboring countries.
However, the ongoing conflict has derailed these ambitions. Sudan formally canceled the port deal, with its finance minister declaring, “After what happened, we will not give the UAE a single centimeter on the Red Sea.”
Diverging Visions: Egypt vs. the UAE
Sudan’s war has exposed a fundamental divide between Egypt and the UAE’s long-term visions for the country.
Egypt sees the SAF as the critical institutional backbone of Sudan, mirroring its own military governance model.
As a result, Cairo is firmly committed to ensuring the SAF’s dominance and aims to position it as the leading force in any future Sudanese government.
This vision excludes the participation of paramilitary groups like the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which Egypt fears could reignite conflict along its southern border.
In contrast, the UAE views Sudan primarily through an extractive lens, seeking strategic access to the country’s vital resources.
Within this framework, the RSF serves as a key tool for resource extraction, with Dubai already being the primary destination for gold smuggled by the militia.
Realizing that it faces a well-resourced force backed by a foreign sponsor, the Sudanese government has agreed to engage in direct talks with the UAE—but only under the condition that Abu Dhabi ceases its support for the RSF and pays “compensation to the Sudanese people.”
This offer represents a potential exit from the ongoing conflict, though it poses both financial and reputational challenges—even for the wealthy Gulf state.
The war has devastated much of Sudan’s productive infrastructure, causing losses exceeding $200 billion. The UAE would effectively be committing to financing the reconstruction of Sudan—Africa’s third-largest country—while also agreeing to the dissolution of the RSF, a force crucial to its economic and strategic interests in Sudan and as a mercenary power in key geopolitical theaters, such as Yemen.
Additionally, it would require the UAE to acknowledge its role in fueling the world’s largest humanitarian and displacement crisis by arming the RSF—actions that starkly contrast with its carefully curated image as a humanitarian benefactor.
Given the current dynamics, Egypt is well-positioned to play a critical mediating role in bridging the widening gap between Sudan’s demands and the UAE’s persistent narrative of denial.
Sudan’s foreign minister has already indicated that such an initiative is underway following the Egyptian foreign minister’s recent visit to Sudan’s wartime capital, Port Sudan—his second visit in just six weeks.
The path forward, though challenging, is clear: it requires a meeting between Abu Dhabi and Cairo to secure a near-term ceasefire and ensure Sudan’s long-term stability.
There is also an opportunity for the United States to leverage its diplomatic influence to mediate between Egypt and the UAE, encouraging its allies to find common ground and preventing Sudan from further spiraling into crisis.
The alternative is clear—continued support for opposing factions will only deepen Sudan’s descent into a prolonged and increasingly brutal civil war.
